At the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG), a host of political actors come together to discuss the global economy, international development, and the world’s financial system. Among them: central bankers, ministers, parliamentarians, as well as representatives from the private sector, civil society, and academia. Many of the participants will have received, based on the priorities of their home countries and other stakeholders, instructions on how to behave. But when they meet in the halls of the Bretton Woods twins, they also speak to each other face-to-face as individuals.
To be sure, a lot has been written (and rightly so) about the dominance of powerful member-states in global governance. The so-called ‘gentleman’s agreement’ is living proof of this: the United States and European countries continue to have the final say on the selection of the IMF Managing Director and the World Bank President. The unequal distribution of power is also relevant for emerging policy issues. For example, in new research with my colleague Lara Merling, we show that climate-vulnerable countries command merely 4.2% of the quota shares in the IMF, even though they account for almost a third of the IMF’s 190 country-membership. Not only do these quotas dictate the financial contributions of member-states and regulate access to funding, but they also determine countries’ voting shares. For climate-vulnerable countries, their quotas translate into 5.6% of the formal vote—and the formal voting shares are often seen as indicative of their influence in decision-making.
Yes, voting power matters, Executive Board members themselves have acknowledged as much. A recent study by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office documents that “a clear majority of Board survey respondents believed that the capacity to influence decision-making is broadly aligned with voting power.” As a result, we tend to reduce delegates in the resident IMF Executive Board (the Fund’s decision-making body for everyday operations) to the resources and priorities of their home states. Yet this does not paint the full picture on how the Executive Board works in practice.
The relative lack of attention to state representatives as individuals motivated me to speak to former IMF Executive Board members and tell their view on decision-making. In a recent article, I demonstrate that the traits of individuals, their skills, their personalities, matter beyond voting shares. First, Executive Directors (EDs) differ in the extent to which they can act independently of their home authorities. Representatives from single-country constituencies—EDs from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Germany—tend to receive strict instructions from their governments. This is not necessarily the case for delegates who represent multiple countries. While this may seemingly put them at a disadvantage, they can leverage the relative lack of guidelines from their authorities to speak with a more independent voice and raise issues of interest to the whole institution.
Second, delegates differ in their experience, expertise, and negotiation skills. For example, given the technocratic nature of the Fund, IMF staff are receptive to arguments that are consistent with organizational principles and precedents. But social and negotiation skills also come in handy for EDs vis-à-vis their peers.
Together, a degree of autonomy and relevant skills make what I call ‘respected individuals’—state representatives who can wield outsize influence. Alexandre Kafka, who represented Brazil and eight countries from the region for more than 30 years in the Executive Board, is a great example of this.
What does all of this mean for IMF governance? Without denying the importance of voting shares and the need for quota realignment, the onus is also on member-states to send well-equipped individuals to the Executive Board. Smaller countries do face structural obstacles, but this should not obviate the need for civil society organizations and academics to hold national governments accountable. After all, when the political elite lands in DC in mid-April, they do so as individuals.
That individuals matter is already recognized in other aspects of IMF governance. It is one reason why civil society groups launched an open letter to call for a meritocratic, transparent, and open leadership selection process of IMF Managing Director.
IMF Boss 